TCC 2022

The Parallel Reversible Pebbling Game: Analyzing the Post-Quantum Security of iMHFs

Jeremiah Blocki, Blake Holman, and Seunghoon Lee

November 7, 2022



Problem. Given a function $f : \{0, 1\}^n \to \{0, 1\}^n$ and a target output y, find an input $x \in \{0, 1\}^n$ such that y = f(x).



Find $x \in \{0, 1\}^8$ s.t. f(x) = 11001101

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- Quantum Computing: Grover's algorithm [Gro96]
 - only requires $\mathcal{O}(2^{n/2})$ black-box queries to the function f
 - $\circ~$ this is tight: any quantum algorithm using f as a black box must make $\Omega(2^{n/2})$ queries [BBBV97]

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- What is the full cost of a quantum pre-image attack?

The full cost of a quantum pre-image attack is defined as the space-time cost (ST-cost), i.e.,

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If we instantiate f with a quantum circuit C_f of width w and depth d using Grover's algorithm, (total ST-cost of the attack) = $O(wd \cdot 2^{n/2})$.

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Questions.

- How do we characterize the space-time cost of a quantum pre-image attack?
 - $\circ\,$ will visit later with a relevant game
- Can we build f with high space-time cost to resist quantum pre-image attacks?

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 $\overline{C_f}$

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- Memory-Hard Functions!
- Application: password hashing

depth $\mathcal{O}(d \cdot 2^{n/2})$

If we instantiate f with a quantum circuit C_f of width w and depth d using Grover's algorithm,

repeat $\approx \frac{\pi}{4} \cdot 2^{n/2}$ times

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Space-Time Complexity

In the Black Pebbling Game



A pebbling $P = (P_1 = \{1\}, P_2 = \{1,2\}, P_3 = \{2,3\}, P_4 = \{4\})$

Space-Time (ST) Complexity

- $ST(P) = (time) \times (max space)$, and $ST(G) = \min_{P} ST(P)$
- For above example, we have

$$\mathsf{ST}(P) = 4 \times 2 = 8$$

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No!

Why?

- Quantum circuits must be *reversible*
- $P_3 = \{2,3\} \rightarrow P_4 = \{4\}$: not a *reversible* transition
- Quantum Uncomputation in the QROM:

 $egin{aligned} &|x,y
angle \stackrel{H}{\longmapsto} |x,y\oplus H(x)
angle\ &\therefore |(L_1,L_2),L_3
angle \stackrel{H}{\longmapsto} |(L_1,L_2),L_3\oplus H(L_1,L_2)
angle\ &= |(L_1,L_2),0^k
angle \end{aligned}$

 $\therefore\,$ to remove a pebble from node 3 using uncomputation, we need have needed pebbles on nodes 1 and 2

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Sequential Reversible Pebbling:

 $\Rightarrow (ST-Cost) = (space) \times (time) \\ = 7 \times 23 = 161$

Analyzing the Quantum Circuit:

- \Rightarrow (ST-Cost) = $12 \times 4 = 48$
- $\Rightarrow \text{ the time cost can be decreased} \\ \text{from } \mathcal{O}(N) \text{ to } \mathcal{O}(\log N) \\ \end{aligned}$





Partial Answer: The Parallel Reversible Pebbling Game & Study some attacks against iMHFs in this pebbling model

Definition: Parallel Reversible Pebbling Game

A parallel reversible pebbling $P = (P_0, ..., P_t)$ is a sequence of pebbling configurations with the conditions (same as classical):

1. start with no pebbles (i.e., $P_0 = \emptyset$) and end with target nodes T (i.e., $T \subseteq P_t$) ^(*),

2. a new pebble can be added only if its parents were previously pebbled, and the following *additional* conditions:

Condition 3. (Quantum No-Deletion)

a pebble can be deleted only if all of its parents were previously pebbled

Condition 4. (Quantum Reversibility)

we must keep the pebble if a pebble was required to generate new pebbles (or delete pebbles)

 (\star) we can make this condition strict, i.e., $P_t=T.$ See the paper for detail.

Example: A Parallel Pebbling

Classical vs. Reversible



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Classical vs. Reversible















- cannot remove pebble since not all parents were pebbled















Reversible Pebbling Attack 1 Attack on a Line Graph

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 $\parallel:$ parallel, \leftrightarrow : reversible

Our Result. For a line graph L_N with N nodes, we have $\mathsf{ST}^{\parallel, \leftrightarrow}(L_N) = \mathcal{O}\left(N^{1+\frac{2}{\sqrt{\log N}}}\right)$.

- We modified Li and Vitányi's (sequential) strategy [LV96]
- A similar (sequential) argument was implicitly assumed by Bennett [Ben89] but was not formalized as a reversible pebbling strategy

Attack on Any (e, d)-Reducible DAGs

Definition. A DAG G = (V, E) is (e, d)-reducible if there exists a depth-reducing set $S \subseteq V$ of size $|S| \leq e$ such that the longest path in G - S has length $\leq d$.

Example. (2, 2)-reducible graph

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- Using this result, we have $ST^{\parallel, \leftrightarrow}(\operatorname{Argon2i-A}) = \mathcal{O}(N^2 \log \log N / \sqrt{\log N})$ and $ST^{\parallel, \leftrightarrow}(\operatorname{Argon2i-B}) = \mathcal{O}(N^2 / \sqrt[3]{\log N})$

Using an Induced Line Graph



- Given a graph G, split into blocks of size b and create a line graph $L_{\lceil N/b\rceil}$ of size $\lceil N/b\rceil$
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Reversible Pebbling Attack 3

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Example

Attack Using an Induced Line Graph





Example

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Our Result.

 $\mathsf{ST}^{\parallel,\longleftrightarrow}(G) = \mathcal{O}\left(SN + b^2 \cdot \mathsf{ST}^{\parallel,\longleftrightarrow}(L_{\lceil N/b\rceil})\right), \text{ where } S = (\texttt{\# skip nodes}) \text{ and } b > 0: \text{ block size } S = (\texttt{\# skip nodes}) \text{ and } b > 0: \text{ block size } S = (\texttt{\# skip nodes}) \text{ and } b > 0: \text{ block size } S = (\texttt{\# skip nodes}) \text{ and } b > 0: \text{ block size } S = (\texttt{\# skip nodes}) \text{ and } b > 0: \text{ block size } S = (\texttt{\# skip nodes}) \text{ and } b > 0: \text{ block size } S = (\texttt{\# skip nodes}) \text{ and } b > 0: \text{ block size } S = (\texttt{\# skip nodes}) \text{ and } b > 0: \text{ block size } S = (\texttt{\# skip nodes}) \text{ and } b > 0: \text{ block size } S = (\texttt{\# skip nodes}) \text{ and } b > 0: \text{ block size } S = (\texttt{\# skip nodes}) \text{ and } b > 0: \text{ block size } S = (\texttt{\# skip nodes}) \text{ and } b > 0: \text{ block size } S = (\texttt{\# skip nodes}) \text{ and } b > 0: \text{ block size } S = (\texttt{\# skip nodes}) \text{ and } b > 0: \text{ block size } S = (\texttt{\# skip nodes}) \text{ and } b > 0: \text{ block size } S = (\texttt{\# skip nodes}) \text{ and } b > 0: \text{ block size } S = (\texttt{\# skip nodes}) \text{ block size } S = (\texttt{\# skip nodes}) \text{ and } b > 0: \text{ block size } S = (\texttt{\# skip nodes}) \text{ block sip nodes}) \text{ block size } S = (\texttt{$

iMHF Example: DRSample Attack Using an Induced Line Graph

- DRSample [ABH17]: a practical iMHF candidate with stronger classical memory-hardness
- For DRSample, we showed that (whp) the number of skip nodes is at most

$$(\# \text{ skip nodes}) = \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{N \log \log N}{\log N}\right),$$

when we set the block size $b = O(N/\log^2 N)$.

$$\Rightarrow \mathsf{ST}^{\parallel, \nleftrightarrow}(\mathsf{DRSample}) = \mathcal{O}\left(\frac{N^2 \log \log N}{\log N}\right).$$

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• Note. DRSample admits a more efficient reversible pebbling attack than Argon2i-A/B cf.) $ST^{\parallel, \leftrightarrow}(Argon2i-A) = O\left(\frac{N^2 \log \log N}{\sqrt{\log N}}\right)$ and $ST^{\parallel, \leftrightarrow}(Argon2i-B) = O\left(\frac{N^2}{\sqrt[3]{\log N}}\right)$

Other Results

Parallel Amortized Space-Time Cost

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- Amortized Space-Time Complexity (aST) for parallel reversible pebblings also matters! (= the sum of the number of pebbles used in each round)

Our Result: We extend the (non-reversible) Alwen and Blocki's attack [AB16]

Theorem. If G is (e, d)-reducible with N nodes with indegree δ , then

$$\mathsf{aST}^{\parallel,\longleftrightarrow}(G) \leq \min_{g \geq d} \left\{ 2N\left(\frac{2Nd}{g} + e + (\delta + 1)g\right) + N + \frac{2Nd}{g} \right\}.$$

• Corollary: $aST^{\parallel, \leftrightarrow}(Argon2-A) = \mathcal{O}(N^{1.75}\log N)$ and $aST^{\parallel, \leftrightarrow}(Argon2-B) = \mathcal{O}(N^{1.8})$.

Conclusion

- We introduced the parallel reversible pebbling game, and
- We use this game to analyze the reversible space-time complexity of a line graph and data-independent Memory-Hard Functions such as Argon2i-A/B and DRSample
- We also give a reversible pebbling attack with low reversible cumulative pebbling cost by extending [AB16] attack

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Open Questions

- Asymptotically stronger reversible pebbling attacks for iMHFs?
 - $\circ~$ Can we extend the recursive pebbling attack [ABP17] to the reversible setting?
- Is there a DAG with constant indegree having (parallel) reversible ST-cost $\Omega(N^2)$?
 - $\circ~$ Candidate: DRS+BRG [BHK^+19], none of our attacks performed well against DRS+BRG
- Can we come up with a reversible pebbling reduction in the parallel quantum random oracle model?
 - We only showed that efficient reversible pebbling attacks yield efficient quantum pre-image attacks, but not the reverse direction

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